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PrincipalExemption Techniques and
Their Relation to Varying Objectives
Our discussion thus far has been confined largely to the type of per-
sonal allowances employed in the individual income tax of the United
States. Several other types of personal allowances and various combina-
tions of elements from different ones have been used in some other
countries, and one or another of them is sometimes proposed as a sub-
stitute superior to our own. In general, the different types or techniques
of personal allowances share one or more common objectives, but they
differ in their distribution of emphasis and in their effects; hence some
are better suited than others to achieve particular objectives. We exam-
ine arid compare below the four principal exemption techniques, includ-
ing the one currently used in this country. The four types are known as
(1) the lump-sum or initial exemption, (2) the continuing exemption,
(3) the vanishing exemption, and (4) the tax credit.1
A. THE LUMP-SUM EXEMPTION
The lump-sum or initial exemption is defined as one that completely
exempts from income tax those persons with net incomes not exceeding
a stated amount, but that does not reduce the taxable income of others.
It contrasts sharply with the so-called continuing exemption, such as is
employed in the United States income tax, which not only excludes from
tax those with incomes, after allowable deductions, equal to or less than
1SeeWilliam J.Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American Public Finance,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959, p. 192; Michael E. Levy,IncomeTax Exemptions,
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the amount of the exemption, but deducts the same amount from the
otherwise taxable income of all with larger incomes.
The objective of the lump-sum exemption is primarily to exclude the
poor—defined as those with incomes only large enough or below the
amount deemed necessary for a minimum tolerable standard of living,
and, unlike the continuing exemption, not to exclude the minimum liv-
ing costs of taxable persons.
The amount of the lump-sum exemption may or may not be made to
vary with marital status, the number of dependents, and age or blind-
ness. In either case, in the absence of other provisions to this end,
such an exemption obviously provides no differentiation in tax treat-
ment for individuals above the exclusion limits for variations in family
responsibilities and personal needs. Further, unlike the continuing ex-
emption, it adds nothing to the progression of effective tax rates pro-
vided by the. formal rate structure for incomes above the exclusion
limits.
Such an unmodified exemption technique would accord with the view
that differentiation among persons for variations in dependents and other
needs is not required or desirable at incomes above the exclusion limits,
and that the kind and degree of rate progression desired, if any, can
be best supplied by the structure of formal tax rates.
Essentially this type of personal exemption was used in the British
income tax for more than a century—between 1806 and 1909. The ex-
emption was confined to individuals with small incomes, without dis-
tinction between single persons and those with dependents. In 1910,
however, allowances for a spouse and dependents were added for per-
Sons with incomes moderately above the exclusion level, but not for
others. In the tax year 1918—19, for example, persons whose total in-
come did not exceed £ 130 were entirely exempt; those with incomes
between £130 and £1,000 received no exemption on their own ac-
count, but were allowed small tax credits for a spouse and dependents;
while those with incomes exceeding £1,000 received no allowances for
themselves or their dependents. A "notch" adjustment was used to pre-
vent persons with incomes slightly in excess of the exemption limit from
having their after-tax incomes reduced below the exempted amount by
the tax. For example, the tax on a single person with an income of £131
was £ 1—the maximum amount that would prevent his after-tax in-132 The Personal Exemptions in the Income Tax
comefrom being reduced below the exemption limit of £1 3Ø•2Follow-
ing the report of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax in 1920,
Great Britain introduced personal exemptions and dependent allowances
at all income levels for the purpose of the so-called standard rate of
tax, but did not provide any personal exemptions for the purpose of the
surtax until 1964, when it was applicable at graduated rates on incomes
above £2,000 after the personal allowances and certain other "reliefs,"
such as for earned income.
The Australian income tax law, as amended in 1967, continues to
follow the older British tradition to some extent. Individuals with in-
comes not exceeding $A 416 (the Australian dollar in 1967 generally
commanded about $1.11 in the foreign exchange markets) are en-
tirely exempt from income tax, and no personal allowance on his own
account is provided for a taxpayer with income in excess of this amount:
a single person with an income in excess of $A 416 is taxed on the en-
tire amount of his income, not merely on. the excess over this amount.
But at all income levels, a taxpayer is allowed .an exemption of $A 286
for a dependent spouse and each dependent parent, and equal or smaller
allowances for some other dependents.3 Belgium, India, and the Nether-
lands also employ a lump-sum exemption for the taxpayer proper, com-
bined with allowances at some or all higher levels of income for a spouse
and dependents. Thus, the lump-sum exemption for the taxpayer proper
is combined with the continuing type for a spouse and dependents, some-
times with a ceiling on the range of incomes eligible for the continuing
exemptions.
The absence of personal exemptions for incomes above a
exclusion limit permits a given amount of revenue to be raised with
lower nominal tax rates than under a continuing exemption. It will be
recalled (see Chapter 2) that if all personal exemptions on taxable
turns had been eliminated in 1965, but persons previously excluded from
tax by the exemptions were excluded by some other means, the increase
in taxable income would have permitted, the 1965 income tax revenue
to be collected with a 27 per cent reduction in the over-all effective tax
rate on aggregate taxable income; and that if only the exemption for
2Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, H. M.
Stationery Office, 1919, PP. 1—2, and Appendix 1, P. 6.
a The personal allowance for a dependent is reduced if the latter receives a
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the taxpayer proper (but not his wife's) had been eliminated, a 14 per
cent cut in this rate would have been possible.
Since the legislature may adjust bracket tax rates to produce, within
reasonably wide limits, approximately the amount and distribution of
income tax revenues sought—subject to the aggregate of personal in-
comes and to various practical limitations—Australian taxpayers, for
example, do not necessarily bear a heavier or differently distributed tax
burden because they are denied. a personal exemption on their own ac-
counts, nor does the use of the continuing exemption in the United
States necessarily lighten the income tax burden or alter its distribution
among the different income classes.
It is doubtlessly advantageous to keep nominal or statutory rates as
low as possible. A wide disparity between statutory and effective tax
rates fosters public misunderstanding, confusion, and exaggerated no-
tions regarding the effective level of tax rates. Further, to the extent that
income taxes discourage effort and the disposition to incur risks, it is
the marginal rate of tax on a person's income (that applicable to the
last increment) rather than the average rate on the entire income, to
which many taxpayers are the most sensitive. Hence, among other rea-
sons, there is a strong presumption in favor of making taxable income
as widely inclusive of all income as possible: by maximizing the income
tax base, we minimize the levels of the statutory tax rates.
But the consequences of these differences in mere form or technique
can be easily exaggerated. The effective marginal rates on additions to or
subtractions from a man's total net income are of more fundamental im-
portance than marginal statutory bracket rates when there are signifi-
cant differences between them. If, to take an extreme example, the
law were altered to give each taxpayer a special exemption of one-half
of his otherwise taxable income, and, in order to maintain an unchanged
revenue yield and an unchangeddistribution of the tax burden, all bracket
rates were doubled, the effective and marginal rates on all previously
taxable incomes would remain unchanged despite the doubling of the
marginal statutory rates.4 A reduction in aggregate taxable income re-
sulting from exemptions granted to some taxpayers but not to others,
however, would require increases in both effective and statutory rates
See Harold M. Groves, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, The Brook-
ings Institution, 1963, pp. 31 if.134 The Personal Exemptions in the Income Tax
tomaintain an unchanged revenue yield, if all other relevant factors re-
mained constant.
The lump-sum exemption lends itself more readily than the continu-
ing exemption to increases from time to time designed to take account
of upward movements in consumer prices and in what are regarded as
minimum tolerable living standards. The reason is that the tax effects
of a rise in the lump-sum exemption are concentrated in the lower end
of the income scale and entail relatively modest revenue losses, while
a rise in the continuing exemption reduces the amount of taxable in-
come in every tax bracket and is therefore relatively costly in revenue.
B. THE VANISHING EXEMPTION
The fact that a number of countries couple a limited or unlimited con-
tinuing exemption for the taxpayer's spouse and dependents with a lump-
sum exemption for the taxpayer proper reflects an important deficiency
of the unmodified lump-sum exemption: the absence of allowance for
the size of a taxpayer's family. It is recognized that, particularly for
incomes slightly or moderately larger than the exclusion limit appro-
priate for a single person, poverty is a function of the size of the family
as well as of income. The so-called vanishing exemption offers a means
of allowing for this fact in logical, graduated fashion and yet avoids the
extension of allowances for dependents to those with larger incomes.
In addition, the lump-sum exemption is subject to the technical dis-
advantage that it requires either abrupt and irrational treatment for
persons with incomes only moderately larger than the exemption, or a
substantial number of narrow graduated rate brackets to avoid it. This
technical disadvantage is easily illustrated. If, for example, the current
$600 exemption for a single person were applicable only to individuals
with this amount of income or less, after the standard or itemized deduc-
tions, the 1967 bracket rates of 14 per cent on the first $500 of larger in-
comes and of 15 per cent on any part of the next $500 would result
in a tax of $92.50 for a bachelor with $950 of adjusted gross income
who took the minimum standard deduction. That is, $950, less $300
minimum standard deduction, would leave $650, of which $500 would
be taxed at 14 per cent and $150 at 15 per cent. His after-tax income
would be reduced to $857.50, or $42.50 less than that of a single per-
son with a pretax income of $900 which would be completely exempt.Principal Exemption Techniques 135
If we employed the method once used in England to avoid this il-
logical result, we would specifically provide that the amount of tax
shall in no case be greater than the amount which would reduce the
aftertax income to $900—$5.0 instead of $92.50 in the foregoing ex-
ample. Technically, this would mean a rate of tax of 100 per cent on
the excess of this taxpayer's income over $900—a higher marginal rate
than that imposed on the largest income; though the absolute amount of
tax liability would be only $50. Even much less drastic "notch" adjust-
ments could produce higher marginal rates on additions to some smaller
incomes than on those to larger ones, though here, again, the absolute
amounts involved could be kept small.
Such discontinuities could be avoided by having numerous narrow
brackets and very low tax rates, beginning perhaps at 1 per cent, at the
lower end of the graduated tax scale. However, a smoothly declining
vanishing exemption would serve the same purpose of avoiding rate dis-
continuities and also serve the broader objectives of providing appropri-
ate graduated allowances for family size (and possibly other personal
needs) in the lower part of the taxable income scale, while smoothly
terminating these allowances at chosen income levels. At the same time,
the vanishing exemption could provide the same or different income
levels as the present continuing exemption for excluding the poor.
For example, assume that the present personal exemptions of $600
for single persons and $1,200 for married couples, with $600 more for
each additional exemption, were retained for adjusted gross incomes
(after nonbusiness deductions) up to these amounts. Also assume that,
for larger incomes, the exemptions were reduced by 25 per cent of the
amount by which such incomes exceeded $600 per exemption, up to
the point at which the exemption became zero. Under these conditions,
the amounts of the personal exemptions would decline smoothly as in-
come rose, as may be seen in Table 28. They would reach zero at $3,000
of adjusted gross income less nonbusiness deductions for single persons,
at $6,000 for married couples without dependents, at $9,000 for three-
exemption families, $12,000 for four-exemption families, $15,000 for
five-exemption families, and $18,000 for six-exemption families.
The vanishing technique as just described was applied in Table 28
to all personal exemptions, including those for dependents, age, and
blindness. Its rationale would be that all these personal allowances are
needed in declining amounts as incomes rise, and are not needed at all
for larger incomes. Prior to 1934 the federal income tax operated in thisTABLE 28








2 3 4 5 6
600 600 600 600 600 600 600
800 550 800 800 800 800 800
1,000 500 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
1,200 450 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
1,400 400 1,150 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
1,600 350 1,100 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
1,800 300 1,050 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
2,000 250 1,000 1,750 2,000 2,000 2,000
2,200 200 950 1,700 2,200 2,200 2,200
2,400 150 900 1,650 2,400 2,400 2,400
2,600 100 850 1,600 2,350 2,600 2,600
2,800 50 800 1,550 2,300 2,800 2,800
3,000 0 750 1,500 2,250 3,000 3,000
3,600 600 1,350 2,100 2,850 3,600
4,000 500 1,250 2,000 2,750 3,500
5,000 1,000 1,750 2,500 3,250
6,000 0 750 1,500 2,250 3,000
7,000 500 1,250 2,000 2,750
8,000 250 1,000 1,750 2,500
9,000 0 750 1,500 2,250
10,000 500 1,250 2,000
11,000 250 1,000 1,750







aTotalof personal exemptions at $600 each is reduced by 25 per cent of the amount by
which it is exceeded by AG! less nonbusiness deductions.Principal Exemption Techniques 137
direction to some degree by allowing the personal exemptions only for
the purpose of the normal tax but not for the surtax. This deprived the
upper income groups of much of the value of the personal exemptions
because the normal tax rates at their steepest ranged only up to 12 per
cent (during World War I), while the surtax rates, which were applica-
ble to surtax net incomes of $10,000 or more in 1924—31 and to $6,000
or more in 1932—33, ranged as high as 65 per cent.
A' more limited variant of the vanishing exemption would apply it
only to the exemption for the taxpayer proper, retaining the continuing
exemptions for dependents, age, and blindness, and treating one spouse
of each joint return as a dependent. This is illustrated in Table 29.
A vanishing exemption of the kind shown in Table 28 would have:
to be accompanied by significant reductions in bracket tax' rates unless
a,substantial increase in revenue was desired. We applied this vanishing
exemption to the incomes and exemptions on the 1965 tax returns, and
estimated that it would increase the revenue yield by abdut $11.7 bil-
lion as compared with the existing exemptions, unless offsetting rate re-
ductions were made. The more limited vanishing exemption portrayed in
Table 29 would have increased tax revenues by an estimated $6 billion,
under the same conditions, unless offsetting reductions were made in the
bracket tax rates.
A vanishing exemption combined with progressively graduated
will automatically meet the usual test of a progressive rate structure: ris-
ing average or effective rates as incomes increase.5 But some scholars
have proposed an additional and more restrictive criterion for progres-
sivity: that the increase in tax shall never decline as incomes rise, or,
more exactly, 'that the actual marginal rate shall not decline with any
increase in income.8 To satisfy this criterion under a vanishing exemp-
tion, the increase in the bracket rate just after the point where the ex-
emptions expire must be sufficient to offset the decline in the actual
5Fora detailed mathematical analysis of the effects of the lump-sum, vanish-
ing, and continuing types of exemptions upon the progression of marginal and
average effective tax rates, see Michael E. Levy, Income Tax Exemptions,, Am-
sterdam, 1960.
8SeeA. G. Pigou, A Study of Public Finance, London, 1947, Pt. II, Ch. 2;
Richard A. Musgrave and Tun Thin, "Income Tax Progression, 1929—48," Jour-
nàl of Political Economy, December 1948; Levy, Income Tax Exemptions, Ch.
I and Mathematical Appendix to Ch. I; Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of
Public Finance, New York, 1959, pp. 121 if.TABLE 29
Exampleof Vanishing Exemption for Taxpayer Proper Combined with Continuing









2 3 4 5 6
600 600 600 600 600 600 600
800 550 800 800 800 800 800
1,000 500 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
1,200 450.. 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
1,400 400 1,150 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400.
1,600 350 1,100 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
1,800 300 1,050 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
2,000 250 1,000 1,750 2,000 2,000 2,000
2,200 200 950 1,700 2,200 2,200 2,200
2,400 150 900 1,650 2,400 2,400 2,400
2,600 100 850 1,600 2,350 2,600 2,600
2,800 50 800 1,550 2,300 2,800 2,800
3,000 0 750 1,500 2,250 3,000 3,000
3,200 700 1,450 2,200 2,950 3,200
3,400 650 1,400 2,150 2,900 3,400
3,600 600 1,350 2,100 2,850 3,600
3,800 600 1,300 2,050 2,800 3,550
4,000 600 1,250 2,000 2,750 3,500
4,200 600 1,200 1,950 2,700 3,450
4,400 600 1,200 1,900 2,650 3,400
4,600 600 1,200 1,850. 2,600 3,350.
4,800 600 1,200 1,800 2,550 3,300
5,000 600 1,200 1,800 2,500 3,250
5,200 600 1,200 1,800 2,450 3,200
5,400 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,150
5,600 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,100
5,800 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,050
6,000 and over 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,000
aExemptionfor taxpayer proper is $600 less 25 per cent of the amount by which his
AGI less his other exemptions and nonbusiness deductions exceeds $600.Principal Exemption Techniques 139
marginal rate resulting from the absence of further declines in the per-
sonal exemption. The statutory marginal rates and the actual marginal
rates differ in a vanishing exemption over that part of the rate schedule
in which the exemption declines.
This is illustrated in Table 30 which contains a portion of Table 28
TABLE 30
Progression of Average, Highest-Bracket, and Marginal Tax Rates for a
Four-Exemption Family Under the Vanishing Exemption
Portrayed in Table 28, 1967 Tax Rates
Adjusted
Gross In-
come Less Amount Tax Highest
Nonbusiness of Ex- Lia- Average Bracket Marginal
Deductions emption bility Tax Rate Rate Rate
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
2,400 2,400 0 0 0 0
2,800 2,300 70 2.50 14.00 17.50
3,200 2,200 140 4.38 14.00 17.50
3,600 2,100 215 5.97 15.00 18.75
4,000 2,000 290 7.25 15.00 18.75
4,400 1,900 370 8.41 16.00 20.00
4,800 1,800 450 9.38 16.00 20.00
5,200 1,700 535 10.29 17.00 21.25
5,600 1,600 620 11.07 17.00 21.25
6,000 1,500 715 11.92 19.00 23.75
6,400 1,400 810 12.66 19.00 23.75
6,800 1,300 905 13.31 19.00 23.75
7,200 1,200 1,000 13.89 19.00 23.75
7,600 1,100 1,095 14.41 19.00 23.75
8,000 1,000 1,190 14.88 19.00 23.75
10,000 500 1,710 17.10 22.00 26.00
12,000 0 2,260 18.83 22.00 27.50
14,000 0 2,760 19.71 25.00 25.00
16,000 0 3,260 20.38 25.00 25.00
18,000 0 3,820 21.22 28.00 28.00
21,000 0 4,700 22.38 32.00 29.33140 The Personal Exemptions in the Income Tax
for a four-exemption family, together with columns showing, for vari-
ous levels of income, the amount of tax liability, the average tax rate on
adjusted gross income less nonbusiness deductions, the highest applicable
bracket rate, and the actual marginal rate—that is, the increase in tax
liability as a proportion of the increase in income after• business deduc-
tions. It will be observed that the vanishing exemption in conjunction
with the 1967 bracket rates provides rising average or effective tax rates
as incomes increase, up to the point at which the exemption disappears,
after which uninterrupted continued progression is provided by the
bracket rates alone. If measured by the criterion of rising effective tax
rates, the result is a progressive tax structure. The more restrictive cri-
teria of level or rising marginal rates are also met in the example in Ta-
ble 30 for all the incomes shown, except for a dip from 27.5 to 25 per
cent for those incomes just over $12,000 and up to $16,000. Since a
taxpayer's average tax rate and total tax liabilities would continue to rise
within this range of incomes, the small dip in the marginal rate would
doubtless be regarded as unimportant by many, though it could be
avoided by offsetting changes in the progression of bracket rates or a•
more gradual reduction of the exemptions.
As compared with the lump-sum exemption, the vanishing type offers
the advantages, then, of avoiding an abrupt distinction between the ex-
chided poor and those with incomes moderately greater, while still con-
fining the allowances to a limited range of income groups—assuming the
latter objective to be desirable. But how does the vanishing exemption
compare with the continuing type? Again, it offers the advantage of con-
fining the personal exemptions to a limited range of incomes, and has
the added, related, advantage of permitting .a given amount of income
tax revenue to be raised with lower formal tax rates, while permitting.
the same or different total exclusion limits for the poor. It is not as
simple as the continuing exemption and must be formulated with greater
care to achieve a smooth progression of marginal tax rates. The lesser
simplicity need not pose a difficulty for taxpayers in computing their
tax liabilities, however, because tables in the tax instructions and spe-
cific directions on the tax return itself can be employed to simplify the
application, as is done in connection with the rate schedules.
The "vanishing" device is already employed in the income tax statute
in connection with the tax credit for retirement income. It is also em-Principal Exemption Techniques 141
ployed, indirectly, in connection with the minimum standard deduction,
which vanishes at $3,000 of adjusted. gross income for single persons,
$4,000 for married couples, and by $1,000 additional for each depend-
ent up to a maximum of six. The vanishing device is also used in the
Social Security Act to govern the amount of benefit payable to eligible
retired persons under the age of 72 who obtain income from gainful
employment.
C. TAX CREDITS
Many who favor personal allowances at all income levels for marital
status, dependents, age, and blindness (or some of these), nevertheless
object to the character of these allowances under the continuing exemp-
tions employed in the United States and many other income tax sys-
tems. Their objection is that with progressively graduated tax rates, an
equal absolute amount of exemption gives greater absolute tax reduc-
tions to those with larger incomes than to those with smaller. It does
this by substituting a zero rate of tax on the exempted amount for each
taxpayer's highest bracket rate. Under 1967 tax rates in the United
States, for example, the $2,400 personal exemption of a four-exemption
family with adjusted gross income of $3,500 causes a reduction of $364
in the income tax otherwise payable, but reduces the tax of a family of
the same size with $50,000 of adjusted gross income by $1,200, as-
suming the standard deduction for nonbusiness expenses is used.
To equalize the tax-reducing value of the personal allowances at all
levels of income, some countries substitute tax credits for absolute
amounts of exemptions, and this is often proposed for use in the United
States. Taxpayers would first make a preliminary calculation of their tax
liabilities on the full amount of their adjusted gross incomes after non-
business deductions, and would then deduct. their tax credits from the
tax otherwise payable. Wisconsin introduced tax credits in lieu of abso-
lute amounts of exemptions in 1927 and its example was followed by
a number of other states. In 1948, as previously noted, President Tni-
manproposed that the $500 per capita exemption then in force be
supplemented by a $40 per capita tax credit, estimating that the corn-
•bination would be the tax equivalent of a per capita exemption of some-
thing more than $700 at the bottom of the income scale, and would142 The Personal Exemptions in the Income Tax
concentrate 93 per cent of its benefits among individuals with incomes
under
More typically, the amount of tax, credit contemplated is equal to the
lowest bracket rate on the amount of exemption it replaces. Under such
a scheme, the current $600 exemption per capita (and for age and blind-
ness) would be replaced by a tax credit of $85foreach exemption—
this amount being equal to the tax rate of 14 per cent on the first $50O
oftaxable income plus 15 per cent on $100. With 1967 tax rates, we
estimated from the 1965 tax returns that such a substitution would have
increased 1965 tax revenues by about $10.8 billion, in the absence of
offsetting rate reductions. A comparison of the amounts and effective
rates of individual income tax liabilities under the present exemptions
and under such a tax credit substitute, assuming the 1967 schedule of
tax rates, is presented for various levels of adjusted gross income less
nonbusiness deductions, in Table 31. It will be observed that, in the ab-
sence of offsetting reductions in bracket rates, the substitution of such
a uniform per capita tax credit for the present personal exemptions
would (1) increase the effective tax rates on all taxable incomes above
$600, (2) graduate the amount of tax liabilities more steeply, (3) in-
crease tax revenues, and (4) increase the relative tax burden on larger
as compared with smaller families in all but the lowest income brackets.
The increase of the relative tax burden on larger as compared with
smaller families is marked. This effect would follow from the reduction
in the tax value of the allowance for dependents in all but the lowest
bracket. As may be seen in Table 31, there would be a larger increase
in the effective tax rate for married couples with two children than for
childless couples at all income levels above $1,200.
The amount of the tax credit could conceivably be made large enough
to cause aggregate tax liabilities to remain the same as under the present
system of exemptions, other things being equal. But this would not pre-
vent a shift to a more sharply graduated structure of effective tax rates.
On the other hand, the bracket rates of tax could conceivably be adjusted
downward in such a way as to avoid any significant change in the de-
gree of graduation of effective rates and any increase in revenue. In
that event, however, the principal effect of the change from personal ex-
emptions to tax credits would be to reduce the relative tax allowance
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1948, pp. 302,319.TABLE 31
ComparisonofAmounts andEffective Rates ofIndividual Income Tax Liabilities Under
Present$600 Exemptions and Under a Substitute Tax Credit of $85 Per Exemption
Adjusted
Gross In-
Amountsof Tax (dollars) Effective Rates (per. cent)
come Less Increase Increase
Nonbusiness Tax Over Tax Over
Deductions 1967 Credit 1967 1967 Credit 1967
(dollars) Law a Proposal Law Law aProposaLaw
A. Single Person, No Dependents
500 0 0 0.0 0.0 —
1,000 56 60 4 5.6 6.0 0.4
1,500 130 140 10 8.7 9.3 0.7
2,000 209 225 16 10.4 11.2 0.8
2,500 293 320 27 11.7 12.8 1.1
3,000 386 415 29 12.9 13.8 1.0
3,500 481 510 29 13.7 14,6 0.8
4,000 576 605 29 14.4 15.1 0.7
4,500 671 715 44 14.9 15.9 1.0
5,000 778 825 47 15.6 16.5 0.9
6,000 998 1,045 47 16.6 17.4 0.8
8,000 1,480 1,545 65 18.5 19.3 0.8
10,000 2,022 2,105 83 20.2 21.0 0.8
15,000 3,706 3,855 149 24.7 25.7 1.0
20,000 5,800 5,985 185 29.0 29.9 0.9
25,000 8,230 8,445 215 32.9 33.8 0.9
50,000 22,230 22,505 275 44.5 45.0 0.6
100,000 55,076 55,405 329 55.1 55.4 0.3
500,000 335,070 335,405 335 67.0 67.1 0.1
1,000,000 685,070 685,405 335 68.5 68.5 b
5,000,000 3,485,070 3,485,405 335 69.7 69.7
b
B.Married Couple, Joint Return
1,000 0 0 0.0 0.0 —
1,500 42 45 3 2.8 3.0 0.2
2,000 112 120 8 5.6 6.0 0.4
2,500 185 200 15 7.4 8.0 0.6
3,000 260 280 20 8.7 9.3 0.7
3,500 338 365 27 9.7 10.4 0.8
4,000 418 450 32 10.4 11.2 0.8
4,500 501 545 44 11.1 12.1 1.0
5,000 586 640 54 11.7 12.8 1.1





Amountsof Tax (dollars) Effective Rates (per cent)
Increase Increase
Nonbusiness • Tax Over Tax Over
Deductions 1967 Credit 1967 1967 Credit1967
(dollars) Law a Proposal Law Law aProposalLaw
6,000 772 830 58 12.9 13.8 1.0
8,000 1,152 1,210 58 14.4 15.1 0.7
10,000 1,556 1,650 94 15.6 16.5 0.9
15,000 2,710 2,840 130 18.1 18.9 0.9
20,000 4,044 4,210 166 20.2 21.0 0.8
25,000 5,596 5,850 254 22.4 23.4 1.0
50,000 16,460 16,890 430 32.9 33.8 0.9
100,000 44,460 45,010 550 44.5 45.0
0
0.6
500,000 320,140 320,810 670 64.0 64,2 0.1
1,000,000 670,140 670,810 670 67.0 67.1 0.1
5,000,000 3,470,140 3,470,810 670 69.4 69.4 b
C.Married Couple, Two Children, Joint Return
2,000 0 0 — 0.0 0.0. —
2,500 14 30 16 0.6 1.2 0.6
3,000 84 110 26 2.8 3.7 0.9
3,500 155 195 40 4.4 5.6 1.1
4,000 230 280 50 5.8 7.0 1.2
4,500 306 375 69 6.8 8.3 1.5
5,000 386 470 84 7.7 9.4 1.7
6,000 552 660 108 9.2 11.0 1.8
8,000 924 1,040 116 11.6 13.0 1.4
10,000 1,304 1,480 176 13.0 14.8 1.8
15,000 2,410 2,670 260 16.1 17.8 1.7
20,000 3,708 4,040 332 18.5 20.2 1.7
25,000 5,212 5,680 468 20.8 22.7 1.9
50,000 15,860 16,720 860 31.7 33.4 1.7
100,000 43,740 44,840 1,104 43.7 44.8 1.1
500,000 319,300 320,640 1,340 63.9 64.1 0.3
1,000,000 669,300 670,640 1,340 66.9 67.1 0.1
5,000,000 3,469,300 3,470,640 1,340 69.4 69.4 b
a InternalRevenue Code of 1954 as amended through 1965. Tax liabilities are based
on rates effective for 1967.
I)Lessthan .05 per cent.Principal Exemption Techniques 145
(at each income level above the lowest and up to the highest tax
bracket) of those taxpayers with larger families.
The relative merits of equalizing the absolute tax-reducing value of
the dependent and other personal allowances at all levels of income as
compared with allowing their value to vary somewhat with size of in-
come have been previously reviewed in other connections. It is, essen-
tially, a question of whether greater emphasis should be given in this
connection to vertical equity—equity as between smaller and larger in-
comes—or horizontal equity—as between individuals with equal incomes
but unequal family responsibilities or personal needs.(becauseof age
or blindness).
In favor of tax credits, it may be contended that the personal allow-
ances should only protect minimum needs from income tax; that these
needs are the same at all income levels (and actually do not require
any special allowances at incomes more than modestly above the lowest
of taxable ones); and that the effective reduction of these allowances at
higher income levels would, other things equal, bring about a steeper
upward graduation of tax liabilities and permit a reduction in tax rates
on smaller incomes.
Against the substitution of tax credits for continuing exemptions, at
least for the range of incomes that is heavily populated, it may be con-
tended, as we have observed before, that allowances appropriate at
lower levels of income to differentiate between the tax burdens of tax-
payers with unequal family responsibilities are usually too small to do so
adequately as between taxpayers with equal incomes but unequal family
status at higher levels of income, e.g., between a childless married cou-
ple with $10,000 of income and one with four children and the same
income. Further, it may be argued that equitable tax treatment as be-
tween smaller and larger incomes—equitable according to the standards
of the day—is best provided by graduating the effective tax rates on in-
comes of different size to produce the relative tax burdens deemed fair,
but that this kind of equity is consistent with provisions to differentiate
significantly at each income level between persons with unequal needs
and responsibilities. What some members of each income group gain
from such allowances is not necessarily obtained at the expense of mem-
bers of lower, income groups, but, by suitable choice of bracket tax rates,
may be only at the expense of other members of the same income group.
Finally, it may be argued, the present continuing exemptions in the146 The Personal Exemptions. in the Income Tax
UnitedStates do not, in fact, provide more than modest allowances for
dependents, at least in the middle and upper income brackets. The
whole range of the tax-reducing value of each exemption is $70 to $420..
As was brought out by Table 26, the tax liability of a married couple
with four dependent children in 1967 was less than that of a childless
couple by $417 at $5,000 of AGI, $456 at $10,000, $600 at $20,000,
$960 at $40,000, $1,392 at $100,000, $1,632 at $200,000, and $1,680
at $500,000.
D. SOME, VARIATIONS IN EXEMPTION PRACTICES
The relative influence of the various considerations reviewed in the fore-
going (as well as others to be discussed in Chapter 7) has varied among
different countries. In considerable measure, this may be attributed to
differences in traditions and in economic circumstances. Nevertheless,
despite these variations, there is a remarkable degree of similarity in
the character of the personal allowances in the various income tax laws.
The following comments are intended only to call attention to some of
the ways in which elements of the four principal types of personal al-
lowances are sometimes combined or modified, and sometimes supple-
mented by other structural elements of the income tax.8
Personal exemptions that recognize varying family responsibilities are,
8Thesecomments are based upon various published and unpublished mate-
rials, including mimeographed data obtained from the Harvard Law School In-
ternational Program in Taxation (through the courtesy of Professor Oliver Old-
man) and data from the United Nations; Foreign Tax and Trade Briefs, ed. Wal-
ter H. Diamond, New York, Fallon Law Book Company; Carl S. Shoup, John
F. Due, Lyle C. Fitch, Sir Douglas MacDougall, Oliver S. Oldman, and Stan-
ley S. Surrey, The Fiscal System of Venezuela, Baltimore, 1959, p. 87ff.; John
F. Due, "The Fiscal Structure of European Countries," reprinted from Col-
lectanea de Estudos, No. 12,1961, Lisbàa, Portugal, Centro de Estudos de.
Estatistica Economica; Harold M. Groves, Federal Tax Treatment of the Fam-
ily, The Brookings Institution, 1963; and the following books in the World Tax
Series of the Harvard Law School International Program in Taxation: Henry
J. Gumpel and Reubens Gomes de Sousa, Taxation in Brazil, 1957; Henry J.
Gumpel and Hugo B. Margains, Taxation in Mexico, 1957; Walter W. Brudno
and Frank Bower, Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1957; Walter W. Brudno,
Taxation in Australia, 1958; Norr, Duffy, and Sterner, Taxation in Sweden, 1959;
and Brudno, Cobb, and Palkhivala, Taxation in India, 1960.Principal Exemption Techniques 14.7
usually lacking in the so-called "schedular" income taxes. Many countries
that have inherited a Latin tradition impose such taxes at flat but un-
equal rates on different types of income, though an exempted amount
in each schedule, without regard to family status, is common. Exemptions
that vary with family responsibilities are usual in graduated general in-
come taxes, including the so-called complementary or global income
taxes commonly imposed nowadays by countries that also use schedular
income taxes. The following comments are confined to general and com-
plementary income taxes.9
In most western European countries,, as in the United States, the ex-
emption or exclusion limit in the graduated income tax—the level of in-
come on which no tax is payable—is now so low as to subject the bulk
of the population to the tax. As previously noted, such countries as Aus-
tralia, Belgium, India, the Netherlands, and others employ a combination
of lump-sum and continuing exemptions, the personal exemption of the
taxpayer proper being of the lump-sum type, and those for a spouse and
dependents being of the continuing type. A number of countries have
provisions that restrict the tax-reducing value of a continuing exemption
to its value in the lower brackets of taxable income. The Union of South
Africa accomplishes this result by providing the personal allowances in
the form of tax credits; New Zealand does so by placing a ceiling on the
amount of tax reduction permissible from the allowance for dependents.
Austria. eliminates the allowances after income reaches a certain level.
Sweden varies the amount of the personal exemption, to some ex-
tent, according to the relative cost of living in the place where the tax-
payer resides. Each area is allocated to one of four "place groups" ar-
ranged on the basis of the relative cost of living, and larger exemptions
are granted to taxpayers residing in place groups with. higher living costs.
Belgium provides larger personal allowances to persons living in large
cities than to those living in smaller places.
The exemptions for dependent children are sometimes on a uniform
per capita basis, as in the United States, but a number of countries vary
the amount according to the number of children in the family, some of
them granting a larger and some a smaller exemption for the first child.
Austria raises the exemption for each succeeding child up to the fifth,
and a larger allowance for any succeeding child than for a first is pro.-
Except that, in the case of Belgium, the graduated "professional" tax, though
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videdby Finland, France, and Israel; but Australia and the Union of
South Africa provide a larger allowance for a first than for a succeeding
child, and India makes no allowance for more than two children. Like
the United States, Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and New
Zealand give an equal exemption for each dependent child.1° Great
Britain makes significant differentials in the amounts of the children's
exemptions according to age.
The family allowance systems of many countries are more important
than their personal exemptions provisions for families with dependent
children. This is notably true of Sweden, which now grants no personal
exemptions for children in its income tax but makes tax-exempt cash
grants quarterly to the mother for each child under 16, regardless of
income. Similarly, Great Britain and Canada greatly augment the value
of their income tax concessions for children by their cash grants to all
families with children under designated ages.
The most important means employed in some countries to reduce the
tax burdens of many married couples below those of single persons with
equal income consists of providing different and lower rate schedules,
often achieved by income-splitting. This is clearly true in the United
States for, incomes of about $12,000 and over, as is indicated by the
comparative figures for single persons and childless married couples
given in Tables 25 and 26. The equal division of the combined incomes
of husband and wife has the effect, we observed, of making the tax
brackets twice as wide for married couples filing joint returns as for
single persons, with the result that more of the couple's income falls
into the lower tax brackets than the equal income of a single person.
Sweden limits such a dual rate. system to the first bracket, after which
the brackets are of equal width for single and married taxpayers. Some
other countries, such as the Netherlands (and the United States after the
first $500 bracket) maintain the differential throughout the rate scale.
Income-splitting or separate rate schedules are also used in some coun-
tries to provide or add to differentiation in tax treatment for families
with children. The Netherlands has a separate rate schedule for each
family size; Finland has three rate schedules. Income is split for income
tax purposes among children as well as husband and wife in France,
10Exceptthat, in Canada, the allowance is reduced for a child who quali-
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where each child counts as one-half of a person; and in Ceylon, where
the wife, each child, and each dependent relative counts as one-half- a
unit, and the husband, as 1 1/2units,up to a maximum of four units per
family, as compared with 1 l/2unitsfor a single person.
E. APPRAISAL OF THE U.S. EXEMPTiON STRUCTURE
In the light of our examination of the rationale of the personal exemp-
tions, we may now briefly discuss how well the present structure of the
exemptions in the United States is designed to meet the functions of the
exemptions. These functions, it will be recalled, are (1) to provide an
exclusion limit, that is, to exclude from income tax altogether the in-
dividuals and families with incomes deemed too small to be properly
taxable, (2) to provide an allowance for the essential living expenses
of all taxpayers, (3) to provide significant allowances for taxpayers with
dependents and for those who are aged or blind, and (4) to add to the
progression of effective tax rates, particularly in the lower brackets of
taxable income.
In serving as an exclusion limit, the existing. continuing exemptions are
subject to two weaknesses: (a) upward adjustments to reflect changes
in consumer prices or in the minimum acceptable standard of living
cannot be made without reducing the taxable part of all larger incomes,
with the result that, in the absence of offsetting increases in bracket rates,
the revenUe costs are great and the major part of the benefits do not
go to the lowest of the taxable income groUps; and (b) higher bracket
rates are required for any given amount of income tax revenue because
the continuing exemptions reduce the amount of taxable income in every
tax bracket.
The minimum standard deduction enacted in 1964 represents a largely
successful though imperfect attempt to surmount the former of these
weaknesses by granting additional allowances only to those with adjusted
gross incomes under $10,000 and with nonbusiness deductions less than
the new minima. It is largely successful because, for most taxpayers in
the lower of taxable income groups, the amount of the minimum stand-
ard deduction is greater than the actual deductible expenses for which
they substitute and greater than the previous limit of 10cent of AGI
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lowance is the equivalent of an addition to their exemptions. It is im-
perfect and not wholly equitable because it does not distinguish among
taxpayers with different amounts of nonbusiness deductions, thereby nul-
lifying the latter for all whose actual deductible personal expenses are
less than the minimum standard deduction, and it provides no benefits
at all for taxpayers with incomes below $10,000 whose nonbusiness de-
ductions equal or exceed their minimum standard deduction, perhaps by
reason of unusually large medical expenses.
The lump-sum exemption would completely avoid these weaknesses,
though at the cost of some discontinuity in marginal tax rates just above
the exclusion limits. It would permit complete exclusion from income
tax of those with incomes below a stipulated figure, without reducing
the taxable incomes of others. It could be used in lieu of the present
continuing exemption for the taxpayer proper even though continuing
exemptions were retained for a spouse and dependents, as is done in
Australia. Tax credits would be subject to weaknesses similar to those
of the continuing exemptions, though in somewhat lesser degree, because
alterations in them would also affect tax liabilities in every income
bracket. The vanishing exemption, which may be regarded as a smoother
and more flexible version of the lump-sum exemption, would not be sub-
ject to these weaknesses except in small degree, for it would reduce tax-
able income by declining amounts as incomes rose and would cease to
reduce them altogether after the vanishing point had been reached. Like
the lump-sum exemption, it could be used for the taxpayer proper even
though continuing exemptions were retained for a spouse and dependents.
The second function of the continuing exemption, that of providing
an allowance for the essential living expenses of all taxpayers, is, we have
seen, largely illusory. An equal exemption that is given to all is truly
given to none, except those excluded thereby from tax, for the tax rates
on the reduced taxable amounts of incomes must be raised to offset the
exemption, if the income tax is to produce a given amount of revenue.
Taxpayers would be no worse off if they were deprived of the present ex-
emption on their own accounts and the bracket tax rates on taxable in-
come were correspondingly reduced so as to provide the same effective
tax rates as before. The existence of this exemption often leads to ill-
founded and misleading comparisons and inferences, such as that the
adult taxpayer (above the exclusion limit) obviously needs a larger ex-
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it differentiates at every income level between taxpayers with children
and those without; the exemption on the taxpayer's own account, ex-
cept as it serves as an exclusion device, is essentially nominal.
In the third function, that of providing significant allowances for tax-
payers with dependents and for those who are aged or blind, the present
continuing exemptions, we have seen, imply an objective to vary the tax-
reducing value of such allowances with the taxpayer's marginal bracket
rate in order, presumably, to take account of differences in taxpaying
ability arising from these variations in personal circumstances at every
income level among taxpayers with equal incomes. Those who believe
that the allowances for dependents are more appropriately limited to
the lower and perhaps moderate income groups would logically prefer a
lump-sum or vanishing exemption. Persuasive grounds for a continuing
exemption rather than a tax credit for the aged and blind with incomes
above the exclusion levels are even less discernible.
The continuing exemption provides a brisk progression of effective
tax rates in the lower part of the income scale, apart from any gradu-
ation of bracket rates, by placing a zero rate, in effect, on the amount
of income excluded by the exemption; for the exemption constitutes a
larger fraction of smaller than of larger incomes. A similar effect would
be provided in even greater degree by the substitution of a uniform tax
credit for each exemption. The lump-sum technique would rely wholly
upon the formal tax rates to provide progression, while the vanishing
exemption technique would rely for progression upon formal tax rates
only for incomes above those eligible for exemptions; it would add at a
diminishing rate to the progression provided by the tax rates as incomes
rose above the lowest taxable level to the point at which exemptions
vanished.
An understanding of the functiOning of the personal exemptions in
the United States must go beyond structural aspects. We must consider
the appropriateness of the present levels as well as the relative amounts
allowed for different purposes, in relation to the cost of living, subjects
to which we now turn.